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LONE WOLF,

OR HOW TO TAKE PROPERTY
BY CALLING IT A "MERE CHANGE
IN THE FORM OF INVESTMENT ' '@

Joseph William Singer*
[F]ull administrative power [is] possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property.
In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of such
power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the
property of those who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the
government.
Justice Edward Douglass White, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock1

It was a dark and stormy night.2 One hundred years have passed since the
Supreme Court's ruling in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.3 This is not an occasion for
celebration. Lone Wolf is among the worst decisions ever made by the Supreme
Court and is arguably the most unjust decision of all time in the field of federal
Indian law-although several other Supreme Court decisions come close.4 Lone
Wolf has been called the "the Indians' Dred Scott Decision" 5 because, just as Dred
Scott ruled that African-Americans were beyond the protection of the
Constitution, Lone Wolf appeared to rule that all questions regarding federal
© 2002 Joseph William Singer.
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. Thanks and affection go to Martha Minow, Judy
Royster, and Rennard Strickland.
1. 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
2. In order to avoid facing a blank page when I begin writing, I have long started every project
with the sentence "It was a dark and stormy night"-gleaned from Snoopy's novel in the Charles M.
Schulz cartoon, Peanuts, but probably originally taken from the novel by Bulwer-Lytton. Edward
George Bulwer-Lytton, Paul Clifford (Richard Colburn & Richard Bentley 1830). Cf Scott Rice, It
Was a Dark and Stormy Night: The Best (?) from the Bulwer-Lytton Contest (Penguin 1984)
(lampooning Bulwer-Lytton through contest to write the worst possible first sentence in a novel);
Madeleine L'Engle, A Wrinkle in Time 3 (Yearling Books 1962) (well-known children's novel that
begins with the sentence "It was a dark and stormy night."). I have been doing this since I began
writing papers for class in high school. I always (or almost always, see Joseph William Singer, Radical
Moderation, 1985 Am. B. Found. Research J. 329) take the sentence out when I prepare the final draft.
This time I have kept it in for perhaps obvious reasons. The decision in Lone Wolf did indeed
represent a "dark and stormy night."
3. 187 U.S. 553.
4. See e.g. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978); Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
5. Sioux Nation of Indians v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring),
affd, sub nom. U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians,448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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power over Indians and Indian nations were "political questions" unreviewable by
courts. Under this scheme, Congress has "plenary power" over Indians and
Indian affairs; the Court interpreted plenary power to mean absolute power-an
interpretation that would be applicable to no other class of persons. As it did in
Dred Scott, this meant that Indians had no constitutional rights whatsoever-an
uncomfortable finding for a nation supposedly devoted to the principle that
individual constitutional rights are the means through which justice, liberty,
equality, and government restraint are ensured.
The idea that Indians and Indian tribes have no constitutional rights and that
the Constitution places no limits on the plenary power of Congress over Indian
nations has been partially repudiated by the Supreme Court,6 as has the holding of
Dred Scott. The Supreme Court has also partially repudiated the holding that
tribal property rights recognized by treaty are not "property" within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment and thus may be taken without compensation.7
However, these rulings have not been entirely overruled.

Congress still has

plenary power over Indian nations. Although the Court has granted tribes
constitutional protection against the uncompensated taking of some, but not all,8
tribal property rights, it has never otherwise struck down an act of Congress
affecting Indian affairs no matter how deeply it cut into reserved tribal rights
previously protected under federal law and solemn treaties. 9

While the Supreme Court has repudiated part of the Lone Wolf holding by
granting tribes limited protection for tribal title recognized by treaty or statute, it

has not repudiated two significant findings of the Lone Wolf Court. First, Lone
Wolf held that Congress may abrogate an Indian treaty without the consent of the
tribe. 10 This rule is still the law today. Second, the Supreme Court continues to

6. See Del. Tribal Bus. Commn. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
7. U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). See Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role
in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 Or. L. Rev. 245
(1982). See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in
the United States, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 453 (1994); Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the
Conqueror, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 753 (1992); Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight
of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481 (1994).
8. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the
Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 Hastings L.J. 1215 (1980).
9. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984).
10. The first case to hold this was probably The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870) (providing
that Congress could impose a tax on the Cherokee Nation despite the 1866 Treaty which exempted
them from taxation). However, the Supreme Court repudiated the reasoning and result of The
Cherokee Tobacco in 1883 in the case of United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whisky, 108 U.S. 491
(1883), when it held that a treaty promise not to allow liquor in Indian country cannot be abrogated by
a subsequent federal act in the absence of a clear statement by Congress of its intent to do so. "The
laws of [C]ongress are always to be construed so as to conform to the provisions of a treaty, if it be
possible to do so without violence to their language." Forty-Three Gallons of Whisky, 108 U.S. at 496.
This rule operates with special force where a conflict would lead to the abrogation of a stipulation in a
treaty making a valuable cession to the United States. Id. Language in The Cherokee Tobacco to the
contrary was repudiated. See id. at 497-98 ("The case of The Cherokee Tobacco cannot be treated as
authority against the conclusion we have reached. The decision only disposed of that case, as three of
the judges of the court did not sit in it, and two dissented from the judgment pronounced by the other
four.").
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state, as recently as 1980, that the action complained of in Lone Wolf was not a
taking or deprivation of property rights, but rather it was "a mere change in the
form of investment" of the property.1" If these propositions are both correct, then
Lone Wolf would have come out the same way even if Indian nations had been
fully protected by the Constitution in 1903.
This view regarding the rights at stake in Lone Wolf suggests that what
happened in that case was not so bad; even if constitutional protections had been
offered, the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes would still have lost the case. I
have long thought that this conclusion is incorrect. The forced allotment practices
challenged in Lone Wolf were not ordinary acts of Congress."z They
fundamentally altered the constitutional framework governing the relations
between Indian nations and the United States, and they did so in a manner that
violated the deepest values embedded in the Constitution. Assuming that this
argument is correct, Lone Wolf was a travesty, not only because it placed Indians
beyond the reach of the Constitution, but also because it legitimated both an act
of conquest 3 and what is probably the most massive uncompensated taking of
property in United States history. This brief essay will explain why Lone Wolf
should be understood in this manner.
I.

How LONE WOLF EFFECTED AN ACT OF CONQUEST

As Professor Robert Clinton has recently shown,14 the United States
refrained from interfering in purely internal affairs of tribes until 1885 when
Congress passed the Major Crimes Act.'5 That law provided for federal
prosecution of major crimes, such as murder, by one Indian against another.
Where did Congress get the power to pass such a law? The only relevant
enumerated power in the Constitution is the Indian Commerce Clause. However,
when the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act
in United States v. Kagama16 in 1886, it explicitly rejected the Indian Commerce
Clause as the basis for the Act. Rather, it found the power implied by the nature
of the federal-tribal relationship. The Court simply assumed that the United
States must have power over the tribes because they were the "wards" of the
government in need of protection. And, with the need of protection came the

11. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413 ("given the provisions of the Act at issue in Lone Wolf, the Court
reasonably was able to conclude that 'the action of Congress now complained of was but ... a mere
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property.' Under the Act of June 6, 1900, each head
of a family was to be allotted a tract of land within the reservation of not less than 320 acres, an
additional 480,000 acres of grazing land were set aside for the use of the tribes in common, and $2
million was paid to the Indians for the remaining surplus.").
12. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1995).
13. See Jo Carrillo, Disabling Certitudes:An Introduction to the Role of Mythologies of Conquest in
Law, 12 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Policy 13 (2000); Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native
American Law and Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. Gender Race & Just. 325 (1998).
14. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No FederalSupremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113
(2002).
15. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) (enacted under Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385
(1885)).
16. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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power to grant it. The Court further suggested that because the tribes are
"domestic dependent 1 7nations," they must be subject to overriding federal
authority by definition.

It had long ago been established that tribes are "domestic" rather than
"foreign" nations.18

In the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'" the

Supreme Court denominated tribes as "domestic dependent nations." They are
"domestic" rather than "foreign" because they are within, rather than without, the
United States.2° They are "dependent" because they are disabled from entering
into treaties with foreign nations. 21 It is important to note that these two
limitations on tribal power in no way differentiate tribes from states. States, like
tribes, are within the United States; states, like tribes, are constitutionally
prohibited from entering into treaties with foreign nations.22
The 1886 decision in Kagama was the first to hold that the tribes' dependent
status meant something more, i.e., that tribes are subject to overriding federal
power to regulate their internal affairs.23 Yet our constitutional system is based on
the idea of consent. 24 The several states created the United States by agreeing to
accept the Constitution and voting to become part of the United States. They
delegated certain enumerated powers to the federal government. As recent
federalism cases have dramatically shown, the Supreme Court believes that the
states retained all previous powers and immunities they possessed unless they
consented to relinquish them to the federal government when they joined the
Union. When did the tribes consent to be part of the Union? If they did so at
all, it was through the treaty process.26 As Professor Philip Frickey has argued,

17. Id. at 381, 384.
18. Id. at 384.
19. 30 U.S. I (t831).
20. Id. at 18.
21. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
22. U.S. Const art. I, § 7(10)(1) ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation .... "). The only other limitation on tribal powers recognized before 1886 is the
inability of the tribes to convey fee simple title to land that would be recognized in the courts of the
United States. Johnson, 21 U.S. 543. This restraint on alienation has never prevented tribes from
transferring property under their own law and it has long been accepted as a useful protection from
fraudulent loss of lands. It has been criticized as harmful to the tribes by limiting them to one buyer,
thus preventing market competition for tribal lands and limiting the price the tribes can acquire for sale
of their lands and allowing the United States to buy Indian land cheaply. However, the low prices paid
to the tribes for their land had less to do with a lack of competition than the general policy of forcing
tribes to sell their land when they did not want to sell.
23. 18 U.S.375.
24. Clinton, supra n. 14, at 115 ("the most revered principle of the United States Constitution ...
[is] that all legitimate governmental authority derives from the consent of the people who have chosen
to delegate only certain limited powers to the federal government (a theory often called 'popular
delegation' or 'popular sovereignty')"); Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government,
31 Ariz. L. Rev. 365 (1989) ("Consent of the governed is a fundamental tenet of democratic
constitutionalism.").
25. Fed. Mar. Commn. v. S.C. St. Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999).
26. Many tribes did not sign treaties with the United States. The United States has even less
legitimate claim to govern these non-treaty tribes than the tribes that implicitly agreed to some kind of
association with the United States through a treaty. One would think that the non-treaty tribes would
get at least as much protection of their reserved sovereignty as the treaty tribes since they retain their
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this means that treaties are quasi-constitutional documents; they form the basis for
the relationship between the United States and the tribes. 7
Kagama held that the United States has plenary power over Indian tribes.28
It granted the United States an unenumerated power and did so based on racist
assumptions.2 9 Although federal power today over Indian affairs is presumably
based on the Indian Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has failed to repudiate
the plenary power doctrine. Indeed, it cannot do so while maintaining the notion
that Congress has full legislative authority over tribes. In the non-Indian area, the
Court has begun to limit the Interstate Commerce Clause, striking down
legislation that does not directly regulate commerce.3 ° If the Court were
consistent, it would have to overrule Kagama and strike down the Major Crimes
Act. Yet the Court has distinguished the Indian Commerce Clause from the
Interstate Commerce Clause and continues to justify plenary power by the United
States over tribes on the basis of the Indian Commerce Clause.31
Lone Wolf went beyond Kagama, adding insult to injury. It not only
justified the plenary power doctrine, but it also allowed plenary power to be
exercised in a manner that violated the express terms of treaties with Indian
32
nations. Moreover, it did so to enable the United States to take tribal lands in
violation of federal treaty covenants. Yet if federal power over the states is
limited by the extent to which the states consented to federal power, then federal
power over tribes must be similarly limited to the extent the tribes consented to
federal power. The extent of tribal consent may be found in the terms of
treaties-assuming that the treaties were mutually beneficial arrangements rather
than coerced deals. In any event, it would seem to be inconsistent with our
constitutional structure to deprive the tribes of the protections the United States
actually provided to them in treaties. Even if the treaty process was coerced and
unfair, it would seem that the least the United States can do is comply with the
terms it committed itself to in treaties that recognize and protect tribal rights.

sovereignty until limited by lawful federal action. Part of my argument is that unilateral assertions of
power by the United States (either through actions of Congress or of the President or executive
agencies such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs) are presumptively illegitimate and unconstitutional in
the absence of a showing that the tribes have consented to federal jurisdiction. See Clinton, supra n.
14.
27. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (1996); Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal
Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 (1993).
28. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
29. Clinton, supra n. 14, at 116.
30. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); U.S. v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000).
31. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) ("If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause
accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the
Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some
authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce
and Indian tribes"); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. N.M., 490 U.S. 163 (1989) ("It is also well established
that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications. In
particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free trade among the
States even in the absence of implementing federal legislation,.... the central function of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs").
32. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
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The treaty at issue in Lone Wolf created a government-to-government
relationship between the affected tribes and the United States. 33 It established the
constitutional terms of that relationship. It is of monumental importance that the
United States took upon itself a limitation on its own prerogatives. The United
States promised, as part of the terms of association between the tribes and the
United States, never to take the tribes' property without the consent of threefourths of the adult men of the tribes.34 If this promise was a mere contract, the
United States could violate it upon payment of damages. 35 But it was not a mere
contract; it was a constitutional compact. The tribes became associated with the
United States in a framework that resulted in giving up some powers while
retaining others. The United States promised to respect those reserved powers.
In the absence of consent by the tribes to federal powers to allot tribal property,
the United States had no legitimate authority to order allotment.
Lone Wolf authorized the United States to force tribes to accept allotment of
their property to tribal members and to accept the sale of so-called "surplus lands"
to non-Indians. 3' The Court did away with the requirement that tribes consent to
such arrangements. But nowhere had the tribes consented to be governed by the
United States in this manner. The Supreme Court held, just a few weeks before I
wrote these lines, that the federal government cannot force the states to defend
suits by private citizens before federal administrative tribunals.37 Why? Because
the states did not "consent" to give up their sovereign immunity. "States, upon
ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of
the Federal Government. Rather, they entered the Union 'with their sovereignty
intact.' 38 According to the Supreme Court, this means that states retain
sovereign immunity "from 'suits, without their consent,' unless there has been a
'surrender' of that immunity 'in the plan of the convention ... ,,,3'
Retention of
powers not given up is required by the "dignity that is consistent with their status
as sovereign entities." 4
The tribes are sovereign entities as well, not just in theory, but by the law of
the land. If the states retain all powers they did not give up by joining the Union,
and if that conclusion is justified by the nature of constitutional government, then
it must similarly be the case that the tribes retain whatever powers they did not
give up voluntarily. Because the tribes did not become states and did not ratify
the Constitution or otherwise agree to become part of the United States, their
association with the United States is set, at the very least, by the terms of the
treaties by which they fashioned their relationship with the federal government. If

33. Id.
34. Id. at 564.
35. U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
36. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
37. Fed. Mar. Commn., 122 S. Ct. 1864.
38. Id. at 1870 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
39. Id. at 1884 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (quoting The Federalist No. 81
(Alexander Hamilton)).
40. Id. at 1874.
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those treaties are the equivalent of the Constitution in setting up the relations
between sovereign governments, then it would be an act of conquest for Congress
to interfere with internal tribal affairs in a manner that goes beyond the powers
delegated to Congress in a treaty.41 Yet Lone Wolf authorized Congress to ignore
treaties with Indian nations and to abrogate them at will.
While it is true that Congress may pass a statute abrogating a prior treaty
with a foreign nation, the allotment legislation upheld in Lone Wolf did more than
that. When, for example, a treaty is abrogated between the United States and
France, the parties return to the status quo ante. They give up their rights and
their obligations under the treaty. They remain separate sovereign nations.
Repudiation of a treaty by the United States does not result in the United States
taking over France or acquiring the power to regulate affairs in France. Lone
Wolf held that Congress could not only repudiate a treaty, but that it could
regulate, without any constitutional limitation, the internal affairs of the tribes.4" It
did so without the consent of the tribes, without any express constitutional
authority to do so, and without any basis in an existing treaty. There is no other
word for this than conquest.
II.

How LONE WOLF JUSTIFIED AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF PROPERTY

The Lone Wolf Court justified three separate invasions of tribal property
rights. They included (1) allotment of tribal property to individual members; (2)
abrogation of the contractual right not to have property taken without tribal
consent; and (3) a transfer of so-called surplus lands from tribes to non-Indians in
a manner that violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the "public use"
requirement of the Takings Clause.
A.

Allotment as an Uncompensated Taking

The Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Nations complained that their territory
was allotted and surplus lands sold against their will. Although it was less than
clear on the matter, the Supreme Court appears to have concluded that both
allotment and the sale of surplus lands were legitimate because they constituted a
"mere change in the form of investment" of tribal property.43 Can this conclusion
be sustained?

Let us first address allotment itself. Does a transfer of tribal

41. I would argue that tribal tax exemptions in treaties are similarly matters of "internal affairs"
when they concern the conduct of tribal members on tribal land. The fact that non-Indians enter tribal
land to do business with the tribe does not justify a federal imposition of a condition on such sales,
despite the holding of The Cherokee Tobacco to the contrary. Lone Wolf, in contrast to The Cherokee
Tobacco, validated federal regulation of tribal management of tribal property through the allotment
process even when no non-Indians were involved. It thus built on the holding of Kagama and went
beyond the ruling in The Cherokee Tobacco.
42. Cf The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (Congress can impose a tax on a tribe despite a treaty
promise not to do so).
43. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
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property from the tribe to its individual members constitute a "mere change in the
form of investment"? The answer is no.
Tribes are sovereign governments and own their land collectively. This
ownership form is not like tenancy in common or joint tenancy; it is ownership by
the collective entity itself. The property is owned and managed by the tribe. Use
of the land is determined through tribal law and political processes. The
ownership is therefore in a collective entity-the tribe itself. The Supreme Court
in Lone Wolf tried to avoid this conclusion by noting that Congress had provided
in 187114 that tribes would no longer be treated as sovereign entities capable of
entering into treaties with the United States. Moreover, the Lone Wolf case
itself was styled as an action by individual tribal members rather than a suit by the
tribe itself, 46 Thus the Court pretended that tribal ownership was ownership by
the individual tribal members jointly-as if they were joint tenants. This
assumption, however, is unwarranted; moreover, it was unwarranted in 1903. The
1.868 treaty guaranteeing tribal ownership was with the tribe-not with its
members.
The tribe owned and managed the property as a sovereign
government-a collective entity, somewhat similar to a corporate entity.47
The Supreme Court held in 1886 that corporations are "persons" within the
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and that their property rights
are within the scope of the Takings Clause. 48 Thus, a transfer of property from a
corporate entity to someone else-even to its members-would a fortiori
constitute a taking of property without just compensation as required by the Fifth
Amendment. If a state legislature forced General Motors to transfer ownership of
its factories to its shareholders, there is no question this would effectuate an
unconstitutional taking of the property of the corporation. A similar conclusion
would follow if a state forced the Catholic Church to transfer a church to its
parishioners or if Harvard University were forced to transfer its buildings to its
alumni. Moreover, no separate rule for Indian nations can be justified. This
conclusion is borne out by the recent cases of Hodel v. Irving49 and Babbitt v.
Youpee, 50 which hold that a forced transfer of property from allottees to the tribe
is a taking of property within the meaning of the Constitution, even if that transfer
merely destroys the allottee's right to determine who will own the property on

44. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000).
45. 187 U.S. at 566.
46. Id. at 562.
47. I mean "corporate" in the old-fashioned, nineteenth-century sense, meaning "artificial person"
or "legal entity" that is separate from the individuals that otherwise might be thought to comprise the
basic legal actors. The tribal government is a "person" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it has legal powers and obligations that are distinguishable from the legal rights and
obligations of its members.
48. County of Santa Clara v. So. Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporations are persons
under the Fifth Amendment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause); See Minneapolis & Saint
Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (corporations are persons for purposes of the Due Process
Clause); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings
L.J. 577 (1990) (criticizing these developments).
49. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
50. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
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death. If Congress cannot transfer property from allottees to the tribe, it similarly
cannot transfer property from the tribe to allottees-at least not without
compensation.
Allotment was thought at the time to benefit the tribes by converting
communal ownership and management to individual private property. The
allotment policy proved to be an unmitigated disaster. However, even if it had
succeeded and the allotment policy had promoted a significant public policy, this
does not mean that the Constitution allowed Congress to take tribal property and
transfer it to tribal members without compensating the tribes for the land they
lost. Through the allotment of tribal land, the tribes lost millions of acres of land.
None of these losses were ever compensated, even under the Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946.51 They were not compensated because allotment was
thought to be a "mere change in the form of investment" of the property. This
assumption was, and is, incorrect.
B.

Abrogation of the Consent Requirementas an Uncompensated Taking

The 1868 Treaty of Medicine Lodge provided that no seizure of tribal
property would ever occur without a three-fourths vote of adult male members of
the tribe. When Congress took tribal property without such a vote, it violated this
provision. I argued earlier that this taking without tribal consent was an act of
conquest. It was also a taking of property. The treaty contained a promise by the
United States not to take property unless the tribe consented.53 I also argued
earlier that the treaty was a constitutional compact; it was this but it was also a
contract regarding the transfer of property from one sovereign to another. Breach
of contract by the United States generally subjects the United States to a damages
judgment.54 Although the Contracts Clause applies only to the states,55 the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause to contain a similar limitation
on the federal government. 56 The United States has the power to condemn
property held by the states but the Takings Clause would require it to pay
compensation if it did so and there is no reason to 'think that the tribes should
have lower protection for their property rights than do the states. In fact,
subsequent to the Lone Wolf decision, the Supreme Court has held that
recognized Indian title cannot be expropriated by the United States in the absence
of compensation.57
No compensation was ever given to the tribes in Lone Wolf for violation of
this promise not to take land without a three-fourths vote. Moreover, this promise

51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70n, 70o-70v (omitted 1978).
52. The Treaty of Medicine Lodge (Oct. 21, 1867), 15 Stat. 581.
53. Id.
54. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839.
55. See U.S. Const. art. I., § 10, cl. 1.
56. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 875-76 ("Although the Contract Clause has no application to acts of
the United States, it is clear that the National Government has some capacity to make agreements
binding future Congresses by creating vested rights.") (citations omitted).
57. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371.
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was not just any old promise; it vested title to the land in the tribe, subject to a
right of preemptioh by the United States. 8 However, the United States' right of
preemption was subject to a condition that it not be exercised unless the tribe
agreed.5 9 The promise by the-United States was in effect a real covenant attached
to the land. Most courts hold that covenants are "property" rights within the
meaning of the Takings Clause and that the government cannot extinguish them
without paying compensation unless some rule of common law subjects them to

such extinguishment. 60 No such rule was relevant to the tribes in the Lone Wolf
case. Deprivation of property in violation of the three-fourths rule was a separate
taking of property in violation of the Constitution for which no compensation was
ever given to the tribes.
C.

UnconstitutionalTransfer of Ownershipfrom Tribes to Non-Indians

Finally, we have the transfer of surplus lands to non-Indians. Although the
tribes complained about the price paid, arguing that it was not just compensation
because it was below market value, there is no dispute that the United States did

pay value for the surplus lands. The issue that arises here, in addition to the
question of just compensation, is whether the taking of land was constitutionally

justifiable at all. Land can be taken by the federal government for a public use but
not for a private use. 6' The meaning of the public use requirement is not entirely
clear. Under current law, it means that the taking must be substantially related to

a legitimate government purpose. 62 What public purpose justified the transfer of
property from Indian nations to non-Indians?
The allotment legislation is unclear on this point. However, we can get a
clue from the terminology, as well as from history. 63 The lands were called surplus
lands because it was thought the Indians owned more land than they needed. 4 Is
58. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
59. Id.
60. Servitudes may be extinguished by condemnation. Restatement (Third) of Property:Servitudes §
7.8 (Reporter's Note). Most jurisdictions hold that compensation is required when the benefit of a
covenant is extinguished. See e.g. Mercantile-SafeDeposit & Trust Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 521 A.2d
734 (Md. 1987); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.8 (Reporter's Note). Some hold that
compensation is not required. See e.g. Burma Hills Dev. Co. v. Marr, 229 S.2d 776 (Ala. 1969); Gerald
Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes §
11.11 (McGraw-Hill 1990). However, the cases tend to be older and the modern view is that
compensation is required when government extinguishes a covenant. "[I]n this Restatement, all
servitude benefits are treated as property rights and thus should be entitled to the protection of the
Takings Clause." Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 7.8 (Reporter's Note); Cf.Blakeley v.
Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. 1974) (upholding a statute that provided for damages but not injunctive
relief to enforce a covenant).
61. U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation"); See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
62. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229 (holding that the public use requirement is satisfied if the
legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980) (noting that a taking occurs when a land use regulation "does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests").
63. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discoursesof
Conquest (Oxford U. Press 1990).
64. "We do owe the Indians sacred rights and obligations, but one of those duties is not the right to
let them hold forever the land they did not occupy, and which they were not making fruitful for
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this a reason to take property away from someone? Redistributive taxes are
based on the idea that the wealthy should share what they have with the poor, but
the taking of property has never otherwise been justified because the owner did
not need the land. The lands were transferred to non-Indians because the nonIndians needed or wanted the land. Now the Supreme Court has justified the
taking of property from one private owner to another to create a vigorous market
for real estate, 65 to promote urban renewal, and to combat poverty. 6666 State courts
have justified such transfers on the ground that they create jobs.67
However, the Supreme Court has never found that transfers of land from
one racial group to another are justified because one race is more needy than the
other. Indeed, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been an enemy of
68
affirmative action. Harms to one racial group to benefit another presumptively
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Yet it is arguable that the transfer of surplus
lands from Indian nations to non-Indians was a huge form of affirmative action for
white people, who were by far the greatest beneficiaries of the transfers. Perhaps
the transfer could be justified as needed to prevent poverty. After all, the Indians
were land-rich and the whites were land-poor. This justification is rather hard to
sustain given the extraordinary poverty of Indians after the deprivation of the bulk
of their lands and the destruction of tribal economies in the late nineteenth
century. Perhaps the transfer can be explained by the conclusion that the tribes
were using the land inefficiently and that it could be better used by someone else.
None of these justifications, for the sale of surplus lands is particularly
convincing. The fact of the matter is that the tribes had land that the whites
wanted and the whites used the allotment acts to get it. It is hard to discern a
legitimate public purpose here.
Perhaps I am being too lawyer-like. The actual purpose was not obscure at
all. The allotment laws were a crucial part of the process by which the United
States acquired Indian lands. They were an integral part of the acts of conquest
imposed by the United States on Indian nations. As such, they cannot be justified.
Conquest is not one of the enumerated powers granted to Congress by the
Constitution. The allotment acts imposed uncompensated takings of property on
Indian nations, facilitated the transfer of property from Indians to non-Indians in
a manner that promoted white supremacy and deprived tribal sovereigns of
retained rights without their consent. These acts were anything but a "mere
change in the form of investment" of property.

themselves or others." Lyman Abbott, Statement to the Lake Mohonk Conference Supporting the
Dawes Act (1885) (quoted in Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government
and the American Indians vol. 2, at 624 (U. Neb. Press 1984), and reprinted in Joseph William Singer,
Property Law: Rules, Policies& Principles1187 (3d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2002)).
65. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229.
66. Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26 (1954).
67. See Poletown NeighborhoodCouncil v. City of Det., 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
68. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Cf Carole Goldberg, American
Indians and "Preferential"Treatment, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 943 (2002) (considering constitutional reasons
for legislation singling out Indians and Indian nations).
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III. WHY IT MATTERS
Why does it matter today whether allotment was an act of conquest or an
unconstitutional taking of property? It matters because the Supreme Court
continues to assert power over Indian nations, depriving them of retained
sovereign powers without either congressional authorization or constitutional
basis.69 In recent years, the Supreme Court has all but obliterated tribal powers
over non-Indians-even over non-Indians who enter tribal land.7 ° The Supreme
Court's recently imposed limitations on tribal sovereignty breach existing treaties,
as well as both congressional and executive policies that recognize the
government-to-government relationship between the tribes and the United
States.7 The attitudes that led to the Lone Wolf decision are still with us today.
Those attitudes allow the current Supreme Court to deprive tribes of retained
sovereignty at will.7 2 The injustices that Lone Wolf allowed to occur are still being
perpetrated.

69. See David H. Getches, Conquering the CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573 (1996); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1
(1999); Judith V. Royster, DecontextualizingFederal Indian Law: The Supreme Court's 1997-98 Term,
34 Tulsa L.J. 329 (1999).
70. See Hicks, 533 U.S. 353; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A
Reinterpretation, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347 (2001).
71. See John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex Parte Young, Expansion
of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 787 (1999).
72. On the impediments to constitutional recognition of tribal sovereignty and rights, see Rebecca
Tsosie, American Indians and the Politicsof Recognition: Soifer on Law, Pluralism,and Group Identity,
22 Law & Soc. Inquiry 359 (1997).
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